Print this page
Sunday, 19 October 2014 00:00

The Effects of December 17, 2013 Operation on the Social, Political and Economic Basis

Written by
Rate this item
(1 Vote)

The Effects of December 17, 2013 Operation on the Social, Political and Economic Basis

Ali Fuat GÖKÇE1, Sadettin PAKSOY2 and Berna GÜNDÜZ3

1 Kilis 7 Aralık University/ Public Administration and Political Science, Assist. Prof. Dr., Kilis, Turkey

2 Kilis 7 Aralık University/ Economics, Assoc. Prof. Dr., Kilis, Turkey

3 Kilis 7 Aralık University/ Public Administration and Political Science, Research Assist., Kilis, Turkey

Associated author:

This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.


The Effects of December 17, 2013 Operation on the Social, Political and Economic Basis

Gökçe, Paksoy and Gündüz

Abstract

While the date for local elections is approaching which will be held on 30th March 2014, an investigation was started by the Public Prosecutor on 17th December 2013.  Although this investigation was seen as an initiative to wear down the government by the members of the cabinet, the opposition parties, some media groups and non-governmental organizations classified it as corruption and bribery. In this investigation, many people consist of statesman, bureaucrats, bank managers, public officials and sons of ministers were taken in custody on charges ranging from taking bribes, rigging bids on government contracts to attempting to smuggle.

There have been significant social, political and economic impacts of this corruption probes to Turkey. On the one hand, opposition parties and some media and press groups have asserted the failure of the government. However, the government has claimed that these operations were launched to overthrow themselves. After 17th December, several consequences were seen: social polarization was increased, some resignations were occurred in the ruling Justice and Development Party, BIST fell down, a sharp rise in the prices of Dollar, Euro and gold emerged, and Turkey Republic Central Bank Monetary Policy Committee increased the interest rates more than expected.

In this study, it has been examined that what kind of changes on social, economic and political basis have been brought to our country by 17th December operation.

 

JEL classification:  H 7, Z 18, Z 19

 

QUO VADIS: Social Siences – ARTVIN CORUH UNIVERSITY HOPA INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL  SIENCES CONFERENCE

 

“İKTİSAT, SİYASET VE TOPLUM ÜÇGENİNDE KÜRESELLEŞMENİN YEREL DİNAMİKLERİ”

Hopa/Artvin, 15-17 October 2014

 

The Effects of December 17, 2013 Operation on the Social, Political and Economic Basis

1. INRODUCTION

Economy is a social science which investigates the economic behaviour of individuals and publics. Social and political developments in a society closely affect the economy of that country.  These effects become more evident in underdeveloped or developing countries as in Turkey. Political operations that started on 17th December 2013 had a significant impact on Turkish economy.

            In order to study close relationship between society and politics, the date of December 17, 2013 and afterwards needs to be analysed carefully. As is known, post December 17 period has witnessed social confrontation, resignation from ruling party, turning upside down of BIST, acceleration in price of Euro, Dollar and gold. Besides this, Central Bank of Republic of Turkey raised interest rate more than expected.

March 30, 2014 local elections resembled to a general national election with the effect of December 17 operation. The election process was done through a struggle between the ruling party and the Community which stands on the opposite of the operation. Political parties considered to come to power through democratic means by gaining the votes of the Community who may unwilling to support AKP. As the presidential elections would take place by referendum for the first time after municipal election, local election campaigns has turned to a contest between the leader of ruling party and the other political parties.

December 17 operation has been a significant experience in Turkish political history. Developments before and after the operation has caused to separation of groups which are once dedicated themselves together to democracy. The possible outcomes of this struggle and separation are inevitable.

            The reasons of December 17 operation and the process in which operation evolved is out of scope of this study. This paper aims to investigate to what extent December 17 operation and the events afterwards have affected social, political and economic life in Turkey. In this respect, in order to evaluate the economic effect, data from BIST, foreign Exchange and financial area have been examined. On political side, election results which are best possible options that would show the success of parties and their effects have been considered and studied. Social effects of the operation has been analysed in relation with the term of victimization.

2. POLLITICS- ECONOMICS RELATIONSHIP

Economy and politics is highly correlated concepts. Economic order that determines the form of government, and economic development has an impact upon peace and democracy. Above all these concepts, there is the case of justice. People are always in competition in sharing the scarce resources in nature since the time of gathering and hunting. Moreover, they were in an effort to behave in cooperation to overcome the power of the nature and to combat with it. Herein, people look for a framework that will enable them to carry out their work safely, to guarantee the life of themselves and their families. This framework is the “order” (Lipson, 1997: 73). The establishment and continuation of order can be provided by law and rules, thus an entity needs that will set up these rules and preserve the prevailing order. This entity in the modern world is the state. State has the capacity and resources to maintain order and provide welfare. The degree of the coercion states use and the form of administration of resources that will ensure the welfare of society determines the type of the political regimes states have.  While the relationship between the politics and economy is examined, the use and distribution of resources will be focused on rather than coercion power. Apart from coercion power, the use of resources and their ownership also gives some information about the political structures of societies. According to Marxism, state as the most significant political entity in society is the result of conflicts between social classes. State is nothing more than a tool of oppression of the class which have the ownership of the means of production. While Marxism highlights the means of production, liberals and capitalists emphasize production level (Kışlalı, 2008: 74-76).

Whereas economy determines the form of government, politics determines economic order and relations. Although there are some differences between economy and politics, they are always in relationship.

3. VICTIMIZATION

Victimization is derived from the word “victim”. It can be described as being victim (TDK, 2014). According to Çevik (2010: 57), victimization means the state of being treated injustice and being oppressed. As it could be understood from the definitions, victimization is a feeling. It is a reflection of problems in humans’ emotions. It is an image of obstacles which people counter for their existence in society from their childhood. For the formation of a sense of victimization, an experience of shock (trauma) is required. This breakdown could be caused by either the faults or negligence of people or natural disasters (Çevik, 2010: 58).

            There is despair in victims that results from natural catastrophes, thus humans are forced to show consent and compliance to these natural hazards. However, hatred and feeling of revenge occurred due to man-made victimization consistently vitalize the desire to take action against person or persons who caused this victimization. The desire to take revenge may not happen due to the some transformation of some people in their life cycle. On the other hand, some other people may achieve their want (Gökçe, 2013: 214).

            It would be convenient to examine man-made victimization in various situations. Whereas victims may grow out of individual actions and treatment of neighbours, friends and commanders, getting away from individual actions may shift the source of victimization to the administrative act and actions. As victimization based upon the individual acts and treatments results from relationships that occur among individuals, situations after that will be a matter  again for individuals. However, the victimizations based on administrative acts and transactions cannot be reduced to individuals and it concerns the public, thus its results extend to political will. The acceptance of political will as a mechanism to bring service to the public by the administration is a moral reflection of the result of administrative acts and transactions either positive or negative to political will.Not only the activities of administration affect the political will, but also the decisions taken by political will and the laws enacted by it again cause to occur victimization on individuals (Gökçe, 2013: 214).

Resentment, anger and feelings of revenge owing to the “political victimization” occurred by the decisions taken by political will may prompt the people individually. It could be considered in two ways. First option is to choose violence against political will, and the second is to look for a legal platform for their struggle. In the first alternative, people commit violent acts including offensive attacks and in return for hat they encounter law enforcement as they break laws. In the second alternative, people seek to repair the bitter effects of victimization, to ease their anger and to take their revenge on a democratic ground by following rules and laws (Gökçe, 2013: 214).

4. POLITICAL PARTIES BEFORE AND AFTER DECEMBER 17 OPERATION

On December 17, 2013, in Turkey that started the day with the operation and corruption news containing serious accusations of four cabinet ministers, the parties of this operation struggled together once. Why the parties which share the same ideological structure and struggle in the same political pathway got separated could be a subject of a different study.  Here, our focus needs to be on the political and social results of getting separation of Islamic communities after their serves and cooperation for the struggle for power.

With the beginning of reform movement in Ottoman Empire in 17th and 18th centuries, this progress created their opposition. The groups who thought their own interests would be jeopardized by the alteration of prevailing order took action by holding riots. This process also continued in Tanzimat, Islahat, and first and second Constitutional era, with the Turkish War of Independence and the proclamation of a republic has shown itself in various ways in the political arena.

The committee of Union and Progress and the Freedom and Accord Party, first and second groups competition in the Republican People’s Party (CHP), multi-party life trials and the struggle between Republican People’s Party  and Democrat Party (DP) after 1945 and their successors, it is possible to see the political and social construction of Turkey. Various victimization experienced during these struggles. The victims who came to power tried to take revenge from the others, and this situation became permanent so that it was recognized as a right of who comes to power (Atay, 2009: 252-270).

The parties to this struggle are constituted by the military-bureaucratic part who are on the power, Islamist groups from religious part and Kurds from Ethnic part. Islamic sides and Kurds have always felt victimized and struggled against the government. However, they used different methods in defending their struggle. While Islamic groups tend to struggle within a democratic framework, Kurdish people have chosen armed struggle. Democratic struggle has opened the door of government to political movement alone in 2002.

Although there are different communities and sects within Islamic group, it became government in 2002 by acting together using democratic tools, and consolidated its place after the Presidential election in 2007.

All the parts and communities creates the Islamic group has acted with the same aim altogether and gained the key of government by general election in 2002. Between the years of 2002 and 2007, the struggle between the government and the group who fell to opposition was almost a balance fighting. This balance struggle is reflected to political arena as controlled disagreement. Military has continued to oppress the government in terms of protection of secularism and the unitary structure, but admitted the right to policy-making on controversial issues belongs to the government (Özbudun, Hale, 2010:141). In particular, in the process of staffing in bureaucracy and strengthening from legal perspective, government followed a balance policy against the military-bureaucratic sector, and meanwhile intended to remain in the power by standing close to the public. In 2007, government’s declaration about the possibility to conduct a direct talk with Kurdish administration in northern Iraq about Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) problem and presidential election was faced a challenge by military and a period of crisis began (Özbudun, Hale, 2010:154). After presidential election, the military took a step back, the government consolidated its power, and then, Ergenekon, Balyoz operations known by the public has been initiated. The main theme of these operations has been to prevent a military coup to overthrow the military tutelage. The purpose of the government has been to provide an advanced democracy in the country and put an end to the military coup attempts. In this regard, operations have been carried over military members and civilian bureaucrats and journalists close to military, detentions and arrests occurred. In this operation, actors can be classified in two groups as secularists and Islamists. After The Islamists who have suffered for years came to power, they made operations to secularists and their forerunner soldiers in order to eliminate the threats that would come from them again. These operations were held in an organized manner by police officers as other armed forces of the state and judicial branch. Islamists achieved their objectives again by their staff –police and judicial personnel- who are raised in the line of their ideology and became the decision-making authorities. Although there are different religious communities in police and judicial organization, it is very well-known fact that Fethullah Gülen community comprise the biggest group among them.

The Gülen community’s infiltration to the police and judiciary, and its battle with the military were in the first instance was met with sympathy by the government and was seen as a milestone in the democratization process. However, a disagreement has been started between the government and the community by leaking of Oslo interviews with the PKK to the press, and it ascended with the initiative of closing down of tutoring schools (Yalçın, 2014: 225-260).

The significant influence of Fethullah Gülen’s group described as ‘the Community’ over police and judiciary and its success 

The general belief in the society is that the Community has quite a lot of supporters. This thought is not wrong actually. The performance of the Community’s in the field of education and business cause such a perception in society. Business organizations, Turkish Olympics, private tutoring centres, student halls, and their extensions and practice in the society are some examples.

            Social structure before December 17 was characterized as secularists, Kurds, nationalists and Islamists. Struggle for power was realized with competition among these groups. Political structure was shaped as follows: Islamic groups and conservatives gather at Justice and Development Party (AKP), nationalist gather at Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and secularists come together at CHP. However, for Kurds it is not so precise, thus all Kurds did not gather under one party. There are a vast majority of Kurds who support AKP. On the other hand, a significant majority also supports Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). It could be seen in Table 1 that very few Kurds support MHP and CHP.

Table 1: Vote Examples of Parties Received in South-eastern Anatolia

%

AKP

CHP

MHP

Independent-BDP/DEHAP

2002

2007

2011

2002

2007

2011

2002

2007

2011

2002

2007

2011

Diyarbakır

15

40.9

32.8

5

2.01

2.17

1

2.45

-

56

47.01

61.17

Şırnak

14

26.93

20.6

4

6.72

2.54

2

2.87

1.18

45

51.83

72.5

Siirt

84

48.78

48.0

13

3.46

2.78

-

2.77

1.11

-

39.51

42.7

Batman

20

46.4

36.9

6

3.91

6.55

1

0.94

0.57

47

39.4

51.7

Hakkari

6

33.49

16.4

8

3.54

0.9

3

1.85

1.3

45

56.24

79.8

Source: http://www.secim-sonuclari.com.

5. SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF DECEMBER 17 OPERATIONS

5.1. Social and Political Effects

After December 17 operation, the first thing coming to mind was that the Community would withdraw its support and assistance from the government in the first elections and that would result in loss of votes in ruling party in connected with the December 17 operation, were the first signals that a divergence would appear among Islamists in upcoming local elections that would be held in March 2014 and presidential election in August 2014. Where the votes which were likely to break away from the ruling party as a result of the divergence would be gathered was also other important subject. Among all these developments, AKP’s leader and his consultant’s statement about machinating to the military staff created a perception in the public that democratic operations were just movements against the army to take revenge (Akdoğan, 2013). Because of long detention, individual application was done to the Constitutional Court of Turkey and as a result of the decision taken by the Court, local courts decided to release the defendants of Ergenekon trials on March 10, 2014 and defendants of Balyoz trials were released on June 19, 2014 (Sabah Gazetesi, 2014a, b). There were members of the Parliament among these releasing.

            The divergence emerged between Islamists who struggle against military – bureaucratic and secular groups for more than a century in Turkish political life caused to new victimizations in political arena.

It would be more reasonable to evaluate the political structure after December 17 operation as there would be evidence of results of local election and presidential election. It is required to wait for the election results to see the political reflection of clearance operation against the Community and the events after December 17 operation. The main opposition party aimed to collect the votes of the Community by nominating candidates close to conservative groups in local elections.

            The elections that were done before and after December 17 operation will provide us to see the political results. In the table 2 and 3, the percentage of votes of political parties which have groups in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey could be seen. The votes of other parties were not included as they have a minor effect on the evaluation. Apart from that, in tables, in the presidential election in 2014, as AKP and BDP nominated different candidates, they are shown in separate columns while CHP and MHP were shown on the same column as they nominated a common candidate. Besides this, after local elections in 2014, the results of the member of municipal council were obtained. The result of local elections of 2004 and 2009 were not discussed to avoid inaccurate evaluation due to some problems in the vote of BDP. In table 2, the votes parties received were shown and in table 3, the rate of votes is given (YSK, 2014).

Table 2: Quantity of Votes of Parties

 

Number of Voters

Used Vote

AKP

CHP

MHP

BDP, Independent, DEHAP

2002 General Election

41.407.027

32.768.161

10.808.229

6.113.352

2.635.787

1.960.660

2007 General Election

42.799.303

36.056.293

16.327.291

7.317.808

    5.001.869

1.835.486

2011 General Election

52.806.322

43.914.948

21.399.082

11.155.972

5.585.513

2.819.917

2014 Selection of Local Authorities

48.843.157

43.543.717

17.802.976

10.938.262

7.399.119

1.729.297

2014 Presidential Election

55.692.841

41.283.627

21.000.143

15.587.720

3.958.048

Source: Supreme Board of Elections

Table 3: Rate of Votes of Parties

 

Participation Rate in Elections %

AKP

CHP

MHP

BDP, Independent, DEHAP

2002 General Election

79.14

34.28

19.39

8.36

6.22

2007 General Election

84.25

46,58

20,88

14,27

5,24

2011 General Election

83.16

49,83

25,98

13,01

6,57

2014 Selection of Local Authorities

89.15

42.87

26.34

17.82

4.16

2014 Presidential Election

74.13

51.79

38.44

9.76

Source: Supreme Board of Elections

In the general election before December 17 operation, a clear superiority of the ruling party to other parties was seen. When general elections of 2007 and 2011 were examined, an increase of 10 million appeared in quantity of the voters. 8 million out of 10 million increase in the quantity of voters changed the direction of election results. 5 million out of 8 million voters preferred in favour of the ruling party. CHP received nearly 4 million of votes. However, any increase in the quantity of votes of CHP tends to be associated with a change in its leadership in 2010. The voters who supported other parties than CHP in 2007 elections were attracted by the developments in CHP and gave their support to it in 2010 elections. Although there is no clear explanation as to the reasons of shift of votes, the votes of AKP and CHP increased. However, BDP’s votes remained still and did not increase. MHP lost 1 percent of its votes.

As a result, when Table 2 and 3 are analysed, it could be seen that there is a regular increase in the quantity of votes of AKP in 2002-2007-2011 general elections. The ruling party had 49, 83 percent of total votes before December 17 operation. The rate of votes of other 3 parties in the parliament was 45.56 percent. In the first local election after the operation, the ruling party received 42.87 percent of the votes while other parties obtained 48.32 percent. It is evident that December 17 had an impact on the public. It could be asserted that the government lost 6 percent of its votes in struggle with the Community. However, this loss of vote was not sufficient to overthrow the government. The tactic of CHP that selecting nominees who are close to conservative groups has also been effective in reducing the ruling party’s vote. It was seen that the Community’s power in bureaucracy was not as high as in the society. Here, it could be asserted that some community members who seek their self-interests have avoided to take position against the government in order not have disadvantages. Therefore, the ruling party has experienced a loss of votes, but it did not reach noticeable amount.

Presidential election is the other criterion to evaluate the effects of the operation. The presidential elections held on August 10, 2014 15% of voters did not go to polls for various reasons. Although the general idea is that the voters who did not go to ballot box have affected the results, there is no clear guidance whom they would support if they had voted. Other parties also have supported the common presidential candidate of CHP and the MHP. Peace and Democracy Party has nominated their own candidate. According to the results, Erdoğan as the candidate of the ruling party received 51.79 percent of the vote while the common opposition candidate İhsanoğlu obtained 38.44 percent of the votes, and the candidate of BDP, Demirtaş, won 9.79 percent of the votes.

When all these data are considered, the ruling party has not been affected by the December 17 operation, and reversed the wind blowing against them with a successful operation and propaganda. The prediction of struggle for leadership and its possible outcomes in resignations from the party that may likely to happen after the presidential elections has not realized. Besides this, a leadership struggle has emerged within the CHP and they held extraordinary congress. The CHP extraordinary congress held on September 5, 2014 demonstrated an example of a democratic race.

5.2 Economic Effects

December 17 and 25 operations have also economic effects besides their social and political effects. Under this heading, the effects of these operations to stock market, foreign exchange and financial sector will be discussed.

5.2.1. The Effects to BIST

TheBorsa İstanbul (abbreviated asBIST) is the sole exchange entity ofTurkey  that was established first in 1985 under the name of Istanbul Stock Exchange (Turkish:İstanbul Menkul Kıymetler Borsası, IMKB) and then changed its name to BİST in 2013. It gives storage and clearing services to the Turkish and foreign-funded banks, intermediaries in the capital market. On April 23, 2013 its name has changed from İstanbul Stock Exchange to BİST (http://tr.wikipedia.org, 2014). BİST is between Turkey's largest 100 companies and they are opened to the public by the method I described.

Stock markets are as a country's economic barometer. If there is political and economic stability in a country, securities traded on the stock markets rises.

After December 17 and 25 operations, BIST 100 index experienced a sharp fall down. The resignations and statements from the political and judicial sector created a tension; stock exchange index fell to the point of 64.555 with a 2.33 percent decline, in other words dropped to the lowest level in the last 1.5 years. In the last eight trading days, the loss in value of the shares was 42 billion dollars. 15 percent of the stock melted in 8 days. Maximum melting was observed in the financial sector. While the melting in the financial sector shares rises to 22 billion dollars, melting in industry sector shares achieves 11 billion dollars. (Table 4)

Table 4: Melting in Stock Exchange in Different Sectors

Indexes and Sectors

Market Value (Billion Dollar)

Market Value

(Billion Dollar)

December 16, 2013

December 26, 2013

BIST All

271

230

-42

BIST 100

BIST Financial

229

131

193

109

-35

-22

BIST Industry

BIST Bank

78

79

67

66

-11

-14

BIST 10 Bank

BIST Services

69

60

57

51

-12

-8

BIST Holding and Investments
BIST Metals and Machines

36

21

31

18

-5

-3

Source: http://www.ankarastrateji.org, 2014.

However, after the local election held on March 30 and Presidential election on August 10, 2014, BİST has started to appreciate again.

5.2.2. Effects to Exchange Rate

The exchange rate is the price (value) of a unit of currency of a country in the currency of another country. This concept comprises bilateral relationship. In other words, the exchange rate is the quantity of national currency (or it can be changed with it) per one unit of foreign currency (http://doviz.nedir.com, 2014).

In table 5, while in October 2013 monthly average 1 dollar equals to 1, 9913 TL, in October 2013 monthly average 1 dollar equals to 2, 0267 TL, after the operation of December 17 and 25, exchange rate increase was observed. On December 25, 2013 1 dollar equals to = 2,078, on December 26 1 dollar equals to 2, 0994, on December 27 1 dollar equals to 2, 1642 (Table 5). To sell dollars in the market by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey was even not enough to prevent an increase in the dollar. In January 2014 dollar almost did a peak and reached to 2, 2272 TL. On September 10, 1 dollar equals to 2, 20 TL.

Table 5: Increase in USD Exchange Rate by Months

Date

U.S. Dollar Rate

2013/10

1,9913

2013/11

2,0267

2013/12

2,0667

25/12/2014

2,078

26/12/2014

2,0994

27/12/2014

2,1642

2014/01

2,2272

2014/02

2,2139

2014/03

2,2191

2014/04

2,1294

2014/05

2,0934

2014/07

2,1230

2014/06

2,1210

2014/08

2,1634

Source: http://www.isyatirim.com.tr, 2014

On the other hand, the increase in the exchange rates observed in US Dolar after the operations has also emerged in Euros in the same way. In other words, EURO has appreciated against Turkish Lira. In December 2013, 1 Euro equals to 2, 8317 TL, in January, February, March 2014, 1 Euro exceeded 3 TL. After the local elections in 2014, 1 Euro has fallen below 3 TL again (Table 6). As of September 10, 2014 1 EURO is available at 2.8543 TL.

Table 6: Increase in EURO Exchange Rate by Months

Date

EURO Rate

2013/12

2,8317

2014/01

3,0333

2014/02

3,0236

2014/03

3,0676

2014/04

2,9414

2014/05

2,8757

2014/06

2,8834

2014/07

2,8795

2014/08

2,8815

Source: http://www.isyatirim.com.tr, 2014

5.2.3. The Effects to Financial Sector

After the operations of December 17 and 25, mobility has been experienced also in the financial sector. The Central Bank of Republic of Turkey held an extraordinary meeting in order to prevent an increase in foreign currency exchange rates. It was decided to increase interest rates in the meeting and this increase was higher than expected. The one-week repo rate as the policy rate has increased to 10 percent from 4,5 percent. The Central Bank of Republic of Turkey increased the overnight lending rate to 12 percent from 7,75 percent (http://www.tcmb.gov.tr, 2014). It was intended by this decision to appreciate TL against Dollar in short term. Besides this, HalkBank has faced a significant loss in stock value due to rumour about its participation in the operation.

3. CONCLUSION

December 17 operation as a struggle between the Islamic communities itself is passed into Turkish political history. In this battle, a new victimization which has recently become ordinary in Turkish political life has been added to the old ones. As a result of the operation, the government took stringent measures, a clearance process has begun in police and judiciary, and judicial proceedings got started against the people whose names are involved in December 17 operation. This time, the families pending before the courts changed but the rhetoric was the same as before.

The actors of December 17 operation has caused to victimization both before and after the operations. In order to ensure justice which is a prerequisite for a democratic state, the people who commit offences should be judged before just trials. However, the policies constructed upon taking revenge of the victimization by moving away from tolerance are likely to lose in the eye of the public. The political and economic effect of these policies result in separation and polarization in the society.

REFERENCES

Akdoğan, Y. (2013). Elinde Nur mu Var, Topuz mu Var, Star Gazetesi. http://haber.stargazete.com/yazar/ellerinde-nur-mu-var-topuz-mu/yazi-820061, (Access: 13.09.2014)

Atay, F. R. (2009). Çankaya, İstanbul: Pozitif Yayıncılık.

Atik, H. (2014). Siyasi Gelişmelerin Türk Ekonomisi Üzerindeki Etkileri. http://www.ankarastrateji.org/yazar/prof-dr-hayriye-atik/siyasi-gelismelerin-turk-ekonomisi-uzerindeki-etkileri/ (Access: 24.07.2014)

Çevik, A. (2010). Politik Psikoloji. Ankara: Dost Kitabevi.

Gökçe, A. F. (2013). Asker- Sivil İlişkilerinde Değişim ve Dönüşüm, Mağduriyetler ve Sonuçlar.  E. G. İsbir (Ed.), Kamu Yönetiminde Değişim ve Güncel Sorunlar, Ankara: Türkiye ve Orta Doğu Amme İdaresi Enstitüsü 60. Yıl Özel Yayını, (s. 213-239).

Kışlalı, A. T. (2008). Siyaset Bilimi, İstanbul: İmge Yayınevi.

Lipson, L. (1997). Siyasetin Temel Sorunları, Çev: F. Yavuz. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları.

Özbudun, E., & William, H. (2010). Türkiye’de İslamcılık, Demokrasi ve Liberalizm. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap.

Sabah Gazetesi, (2014a), Balyoz'da Tüm Sanıklara Tahliye. http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2014/06/19/balyozda-tum-saniklara-tahliye, (Access: 13.09.2014)

Sabah Gazetesi, (2014b), Mahkemeden Ergenekon Sanıkları İçin Flaş Karar. http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2014/03/10/mahkemeden-ergenekon-saniklari-icin-flas-karar, (Access:13.09.2014)

Yalçın, S. (2014). Kayıp Sicil, Erdoğan’ın Çalınan Dosyası. İstanbul: Kırmızı Kedi Yayınları.

YSK, (2014).  Seçimler.  http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/faces/Secimler?_adf.ctrl-state=1aglrnbl5n_ 4&wcnav.model=YSKUstMenu&_afrLoop=24055592597317214, (Access:13.09.2014)

http://doviz.nedir.com/#ixzz3CikVxaFn, (Access:08.09.2014).

http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borsa_%C4%B0stanbul, (Access:  08.09.2014).

http://www.isyatirim.com.tr/p_exchange_avarege.aspx, (Access:10.09.2014)

http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/kurlar/today.html, (Access:  10.09.2014)

 

 

Read 58246 times Last modified on Saturday, 26 May 2018 11:47
Ali Fuat GÖKÇE

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ali Fuat GÖKÇE

22.02.1967 Van doğumlu. 1985 yılında Kuleli Askeri Lisesinden mezun oldu, 1989 yılında Kara Harp Okulundan Jandarma Teğmen olarak mezun oldu. 2008 yılına kadar Silahlı Kuvvetlerde çeşitli kademelerde çalıştıktan sonra Binbaşı rütbesinden emekli oldu. 2006 yılında Selçuk Üniversitesi Kamu Yönetimi Bölümünde yüksek lisansını tamamladı.

2011 yılında Malatya İnönü Üniversitesi Kamu Yönetimi Bölümünde doktorasını tamamladı. 2011 yılı TBMM genel seçimlerinde Gaziantep’ten Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi milletvekili aday adayı oldu. 2012 yılında Gaziantep Üniversitesinde Yrd. Doç. Dr. unvanı ile göreve başladı. Siyasi Partilerde Lider ve Yönetim Değişimi isimli kitabı mevcuttur. Uluslararası ve ulusal dergilerde siyaset ve kamu yönetimi üzerine makaleleri bulunmaktadır. Evli ve iki çocuk sahibidir. Silahlı Kuvvetler Üstün Cesaret ve Feragat Altın Madalya sahibidir.

Kişisel Web Site: www.alifuatgokce.com

www.alifuatgokce.com
Login to post comments